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	Direct BFD sessions needs to be dispatched not only by IP addresses, but also by interfaces, in order to avoid collisions between neighbors with the same IPv6 link-local addresses. Extend BFD session hash_ip key by interface index to handle that. Use 0 for multihop sessions. Thanks to Sebastian Hahn for the original patch.
		
			
				
	
	
		
			472 lines
		
	
	
		
			12 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			472 lines
		
	
	
		
			12 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
| /*
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|  *	BIRD -- Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
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|  *
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|  *	Can be freely distributed and used under the terms of the GNU GPL.
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|  */
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| 
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| #include "bfd.h"
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| #include "lib/mac.h"
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| 
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| 
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| struct bfd_ctl_packet
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| {
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|   u8 vdiag;				/* Version and diagnostic */
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|   u8 flags;				/* State and flags */
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|   u8 detect_mult;
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|   u8 length;				/* Whole packet length */
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|   u32 snd_id;				/* Sender ID, aka 'my discriminator' */
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|   u32 rcv_id;				/* Receiver ID, aka 'your discriminator' */
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|   u32 des_min_tx_int;
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|   u32 req_min_rx_int;
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|   u32 req_min_echo_rx_int;
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| };
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| 
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| struct bfd_auth
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| {
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|   u8 type;				/* Authentication type (BFD_AUTH_*) */
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|   u8 length;				/* Authentication section length */
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| };
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| 
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| struct bfd_simple_auth
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| {
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|   u8 type;				/* BFD_AUTH_SIMPLE */
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|   u8 length;				/* Length of bfd_simple_auth + pasword length */
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|   u8 key_id;				/* Key ID */
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|   byte password[0];			/* Password itself, variable length */
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| };
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| 
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| #define BFD_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH 16
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| 
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| struct bfd_crypto_auth
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| {
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|   u8 type;				/* BFD_AUTH_*_MD5 or BFD_AUTH_*_SHA1 */
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|   u8 length;				/* Length of bfd_crypto_auth + hash length */
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|   u8 key_id;				/* Key ID */
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|   u8 zero;				/* Reserved, zero on transmit */
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|   u32 csn;				/* Cryptographic sequence number */
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|   byte data[0];				/* Authentication key/hash, length 16 or 20 */
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| };
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| 
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| #define BFD_BASE_LEN	sizeof(struct bfd_ctl_packet)
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| #define BFD_MAX_LEN	64
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| 
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| #define DROP(DSC,VAL) do { err_dsc = DSC; err_val = VAL; goto drop; } while(0)
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| 
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| #define LOG_PKT(msg, args...) \
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|   log(L_REMOTE "%s: " msg, p->p.name, args)
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| 
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| #define LOG_PKT_AUTH(msg, args...) \
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|   log(L_AUTH "%s: " msg, p->p.name, args)
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| 
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| 
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| static inline u8 bfd_pack_vdiag(u8 version, u8 diag)
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| { return (version << 5) | diag; }
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| 
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| static inline u8 bfd_pack_flags(u8 state, u8 flags)
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| { return (state << 6) | flags; }
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| 
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| static inline u8 bfd_pkt_get_version(struct bfd_ctl_packet *pkt)
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| { return pkt->vdiag >> 5; }
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| 
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| static inline u8 bfd_pkt_get_diag(struct bfd_ctl_packet *pkt)
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| { return pkt->vdiag & 0x1f; }
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| 
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| 
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| static inline u8 bfd_pkt_get_state(struct bfd_ctl_packet *pkt)
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| { return pkt->flags >> 6; }
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| 
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| static inline void UNUSED bfd_pkt_set_state(struct bfd_ctl_packet *pkt, u8 val)
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| { pkt->flags = val << 6; }
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| 
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| 
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| char *
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| bfd_format_flags(u8 flags, char *buf)
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| {
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|   char *bp = buf;
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|   if (flags & BFD_FLAGS)	*bp++ = ' ';
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|   if (flags & BFD_FLAG_POLL)	*bp++ = 'P';
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|   if (flags & BFD_FLAG_FINAL)	*bp++ = 'F';
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|   if (flags & BFD_FLAG_CPI)	*bp++ = 'C';
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|   if (flags & BFD_FLAG_AP)	*bp++ = 'A';
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|   if (flags & BFD_FLAG_DEMAND)	*bp++ = 'D';
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|   if (flags & BFD_FLAG_MULTIPOINT) *bp++ = 'M';
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|   *bp = 0;
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| 
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|   return buf;
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| }
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| 
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| const u8 bfd_auth_type_to_hash_alg[] = {
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|     [BFD_AUTH_NONE] = 			ALG_UNDEFINED,
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|     [BFD_AUTH_SIMPLE] = 		ALG_UNDEFINED,
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|     [BFD_AUTH_KEYED_MD5] = 		ALG_MD5,
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|     [BFD_AUTH_METICULOUS_KEYED_MD5] = 	ALG_MD5,
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|     [BFD_AUTH_KEYED_SHA1] = 		ALG_SHA1,
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|     [BFD_AUTH_METICULOUS_KEYED_SHA1] = 	ALG_SHA1,
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| };
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| 
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| 
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| /* Fill authentication section and modifies final length in control section packet */
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| static void
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| bfd_fill_authentication(struct bfd_proto *p, struct bfd_session *s, struct bfd_ctl_packet *pkt)
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| {
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|   struct bfd_iface_config *cf = s->ifa->cf;
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|   struct password_item *pass = password_find(cf->passwords, 0);
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|   uint meticulous = 0;
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| 
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|   if (!pass)
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|   {
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|     /* FIXME: This should not happen */
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|     log(L_ERR "%s: No suitable password found for authentication", p->p.name);
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|     return;
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|   }
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| 
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|   switch (cf->auth_type)
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|   {
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|   case BFD_AUTH_SIMPLE:
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|   {
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|     struct bfd_simple_auth *auth = (void *) (pkt + 1);
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|     uint pass_len = MIN(pass->length, BFD_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH);
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| 
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|     auth->type = BFD_AUTH_SIMPLE;
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|     auth->length = sizeof(struct bfd_simple_auth) + pass_len;
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|     auth->key_id = pass->id;
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| 
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|     pkt->flags |= BFD_FLAG_AP;
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|     pkt->length += auth->length;
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| 
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|     memcpy(auth->password, pass->password, pass_len);
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|     return;
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|   }
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| 
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|   case BFD_AUTH_METICULOUS_KEYED_MD5:
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|   case BFD_AUTH_METICULOUS_KEYED_SHA1:
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|     meticulous = 1;
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|     /* fallthrough */
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| 
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|   case BFD_AUTH_KEYED_MD5:
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|   case BFD_AUTH_KEYED_SHA1:
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|   {
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|     struct bfd_crypto_auth *auth = (void *) (pkt + 1);
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|     uint hash_alg = bfd_auth_type_to_hash_alg[cf->auth_type];
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|     uint hash_len = mac_type_length(pass->alg);
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| 
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|     /* Increase CSN about one time per second */
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|     u32  new_time = (u64) current_time() >> 20;
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|     if ((new_time != s->tx_csn_time) || meticulous)
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|     {
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|       s->tx_csn++;
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|       s->tx_csn_time = new_time;
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|     }
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| 
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|     DBG("[%I] CSN: %u\n", s->addr, s->last_tx_csn);
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| 
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|     auth->type = cf->auth_type;
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|     auth->length = sizeof(struct bfd_crypto_auth) + hash_len;
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|     auth->key_id = pass->id;
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|     auth->zero = 0;
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|     auth->csn = htonl(s->tx_csn);
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| 
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|     pkt->flags |= BFD_FLAG_AP;
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|     pkt->length += auth->length;
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| 
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|     strncpy(auth->data, pass->password, hash_len);
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|     mac_fill(hash_alg, NULL, 0, (byte *) pkt, pkt->length, auth->data);
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|     return;
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|   }
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|   }
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| }
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| 
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| static int
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| bfd_check_authentication(struct bfd_proto *p, struct bfd_session *s, struct bfd_ctl_packet *pkt)
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| {
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|   struct bfd_iface_config *cf = s->ifa->cf;
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|   const char *err_dsc = NULL;
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|   uint err_val = 0;
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|   uint auth_type = 0;
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|   uint meticulous = 0;
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| 
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|   if (pkt->flags & BFD_FLAG_AP)
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|   {
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|     struct bfd_auth *auth = (void *) (pkt + 1);
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| 
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|     if ((pkt->length < (BFD_BASE_LEN + sizeof(struct bfd_auth))) ||
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| 	(pkt->length < (BFD_BASE_LEN + auth->length)))
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|       DROP("packet length mismatch", pkt->length);
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| 
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|     /* Zero is reserved, we use it as BFD_AUTH_NONE internally */
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|     if (auth->type == 0)
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|       DROP("reserved authentication type", 0);
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| 
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|     auth_type = auth->type;
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|   }
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| 
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|   if (auth_type != cf->auth_type)
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|     DROP("authentication method mismatch", auth_type);
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| 
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|   switch (auth_type)
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|   {
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|   case BFD_AUTH_NONE:
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|     return 1;
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| 
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|   case BFD_AUTH_SIMPLE:
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|   {
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|     struct bfd_simple_auth *auth = (void *) (pkt + 1);
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| 
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|     if (auth->length < sizeof(struct bfd_simple_auth))
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|       DROP("wrong authentication length", auth->length);
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| 
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|     struct password_item *pass = password_find_by_id(cf->passwords, auth->key_id);
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|     if (!pass)
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|       DROP("no suitable password found", auth->key_id);
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| 
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|     uint pass_len = MIN(pass->length, BFD_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH);
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|     uint auth_len = sizeof(struct bfd_simple_auth) + pass_len;
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| 
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|     if ((auth->length != auth_len) || memcmp(auth->password, pass->password, pass_len))
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|       DROP("wrong password", pass->id);
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| 
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|     return 1;
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|   }
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| 
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|   case BFD_AUTH_METICULOUS_KEYED_MD5:
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|   case BFD_AUTH_METICULOUS_KEYED_SHA1:
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|     meticulous = 1;
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|     /* fallthrough */
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| 
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|   case BFD_AUTH_KEYED_MD5:
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|   case BFD_AUTH_KEYED_SHA1:
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|   {
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|     struct bfd_crypto_auth *auth = (void *) (pkt + 1);
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|     uint hash_alg = bfd_auth_type_to_hash_alg[cf->auth_type];
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|     uint hash_len = mac_type_length(hash_alg);
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| 
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|     if (auth->length != (sizeof(struct bfd_crypto_auth) + hash_len))
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|       DROP("wrong authentication length", auth->length);
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| 
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|     struct password_item *pass = password_find_by_id(cf->passwords, auth->key_id);
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|     if (!pass)
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|       DROP("no suitable password found", auth->key_id);
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| 
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|     /* BFD CSNs are in 32-bit circular number space */
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|     u32 csn = ntohl(auth->csn);
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|     if (s->rx_csn_known &&
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| 	(((csn - s->rx_csn) > (3 * (uint) s->detect_mult)) ||
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| 	 (meticulous && (csn == s->rx_csn))))
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|     {
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|       /* We want to report both new and old CSN */
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|       LOG_PKT_AUTH("Authentication failed for %I - "
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| 		   "wrong sequence number (rcv %u, old %u)",
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| 		   s->addr, csn, s->rx_csn);
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|       return 0;
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|     }
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| 
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|     byte *auth_data = alloca(hash_len);
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|     memcpy(auth_data, auth->data, hash_len);
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|     strncpy(auth->data, pass->password, hash_len);
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| 
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|     if (!mac_verify(hash_alg, NULL, 0, (byte *) pkt, pkt->length, auth_data))
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|       DROP("wrong authentication code", pass->id);
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| 
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|     s->rx_csn = csn;
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|     s->rx_csn_known = 1;
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| 
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|     return 1;
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|   }
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|   }
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| 
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| drop:
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|   LOG_PKT_AUTH("Authentication failed for %I - %s (%u)",
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| 	       s->addr, err_dsc, err_val);
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|   return 0;
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| }
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| 
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| void
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| bfd_send_ctl(struct bfd_proto *p, struct bfd_session *s, int final)
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| {
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|   sock *sk = s->ifa->sk;
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|   struct bfd_ctl_packet *pkt;
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|   char fb[8];
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| 
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|   if (!sk)
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|     return;
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| 
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|   pkt = (struct bfd_ctl_packet *) sk->tbuf;
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|   pkt->vdiag = bfd_pack_vdiag(1, s->loc_diag);
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|   pkt->flags = bfd_pack_flags(s->loc_state, 0);
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|   pkt->detect_mult = s->detect_mult;
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|   pkt->length = BFD_BASE_LEN;
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|   pkt->snd_id = htonl(s->loc_id);
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|   pkt->rcv_id = htonl(s->rem_id);
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|   pkt->des_min_tx_int = htonl(s->des_min_tx_new);
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|   pkt->req_min_rx_int = htonl(s->req_min_rx_new);
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|   pkt->req_min_echo_rx_int = 0;
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| 
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|   if (final)
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|     pkt->flags |= BFD_FLAG_FINAL;
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|   else if (s->poll_active)
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|     pkt->flags |= BFD_FLAG_POLL;
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| 
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|   if (s->ifa->cf->auth_type)
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|     bfd_fill_authentication(p, s, pkt);
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| 
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|   if (sk->tbuf != sk->tpos)
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|     log(L_WARN "%s: Old packet overwritten in TX buffer", p->p.name);
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| 
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|   TRACE(D_PACKETS, "Sending CTL to %I [%s%s]", s->addr,
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| 	bfd_state_names[s->loc_state], bfd_format_flags(pkt->flags, fb));
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| 
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|   sk_send_to(sk, pkt->length, s->addr, sk->dport);
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| }
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| 
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| static int
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| bfd_rx_hook(sock *sk, uint len)
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| {
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|   struct bfd_proto *p =  sk->data;
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|   struct bfd_ctl_packet *pkt = (struct bfd_ctl_packet *) sk->rbuf;
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|   const char *err_dsc = NULL;
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|   uint err_val = 0;
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|   char fb[8];
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| 
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|   if ((sk->sport == BFD_CONTROL_PORT) && (sk->rcv_ttl < 255))
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|     DROP("wrong TTL", sk->rcv_ttl);
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| 
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|   if (len < BFD_BASE_LEN)
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|     DROP("too short", len);
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| 
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|   u8 version = bfd_pkt_get_version(pkt);
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|   if (version != 1)
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|     DROP("version mismatch", version);
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| 
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|   if ((pkt->length < BFD_BASE_LEN) || (pkt->length > len))
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|     DROP("length mismatch", pkt->length);
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| 
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|   if (pkt->detect_mult == 0)
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|     DROP("invalid detect mult", 0);
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| 
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|   if ((pkt->flags & BFD_FLAG_MULTIPOINT) ||
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|       ((pkt->flags & BFD_FLAG_POLL) && (pkt->flags & BFD_FLAG_FINAL)))
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|     DROP("invalid flags", pkt->flags);
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| 
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|   if (pkt->snd_id == 0)
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|     DROP("invalid my discriminator", 0);
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| 
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|   struct bfd_session *s;
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|   u32 id = ntohl(pkt->rcv_id);
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| 
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|   if (id)
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|   {
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|     s = bfd_find_session_by_id(p, id);
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| 
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|     if (!s)
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|       DROP("unknown session id", id);
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|   }
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|   else
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|   {
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|     u8 ps = bfd_pkt_get_state(pkt);
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|     if (ps > BFD_STATE_DOWN)
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|       DROP("invalid init state", ps);
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| 
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|     uint ifindex = (sk->sport == BFD_CONTROL_PORT) ? sk->lifindex : 0;
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|     s = bfd_find_session_by_addr(p, sk->faddr, ifindex);
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| 
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|     /* FIXME: better session matching and message */
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|     if (!s)
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|       return 1;
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|   }
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| 
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|   /* bfd_check_authentication() has its own error logging */
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|   if (!bfd_check_authentication(p, s, pkt))
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|     return 1;
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| 
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|   u32 old_tx_int = s->des_min_tx_int;
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|   u32 old_rx_int = s->rem_min_rx_int;
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| 
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|   s->rem_id= ntohl(pkt->snd_id);
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|   s->rem_state = bfd_pkt_get_state(pkt);
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|   s->rem_diag = bfd_pkt_get_diag(pkt);
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|   s->rem_demand_mode = pkt->flags & BFD_FLAG_DEMAND;
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|   s->rem_min_tx_int = ntohl(pkt->des_min_tx_int);
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|   s->rem_min_rx_int = ntohl(pkt->req_min_rx_int);
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|   s->rem_detect_mult = pkt->detect_mult;
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| 
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|   TRACE(D_PACKETS, "CTL received from %I [%s%s]", sk->faddr,
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| 	bfd_state_names[s->rem_state], bfd_format_flags(pkt->flags, fb));
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| 
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|   bfd_session_process_ctl(s, pkt->flags, old_tx_int, old_rx_int);
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|   return 1;
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| 
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| drop:
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|   LOG_PKT("Bad packet from %I - %s (%u)", sk->faddr, err_dsc, err_val);
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|   return 1;
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| }
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| 
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| static void
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| bfd_err_hook(sock *sk, int err)
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| {
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|   struct bfd_proto *p = sk->data;
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|   log(L_ERR "%s: Socket error: %m", p->p.name, err);
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| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| sock *
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| bfd_open_rx_sk(struct bfd_proto *p, int multihop, int af)
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| {
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|   sock *sk = sk_new(p->tpool);
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|   sk->type = SK_UDP;
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|   sk->subtype = af;
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|   sk->sport = !multihop ? BFD_CONTROL_PORT : BFD_MULTI_CTL_PORT;
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|   sk->vrf = p->p.vrf;
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|   sk->data = p;
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| 
 | |
|   sk->rbsize = BFD_MAX_LEN;
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|   sk->rx_hook = bfd_rx_hook;
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|   sk->err_hook = bfd_err_hook;
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| 
 | |
|   /* TODO: configurable ToS and priority */
 | |
|   sk->tos = IP_PREC_INTERNET_CONTROL;
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|   sk->priority = sk_priority_control;
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|   sk->flags = SKF_THREAD | SKF_LADDR_RX | (!multihop ? SKF_TTL_RX : 0);
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| 
 | |
|   if (sk_open(sk) < 0)
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|     goto err;
 | |
| 
 | |
|   sk_start(sk);
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|   return sk;
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| 
 | |
|  err:
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|   sk_log_error(sk, p->p.name);
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|   rfree(sk);
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|   return NULL;
 | |
| }
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| 
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| sock *
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| bfd_open_tx_sk(struct bfd_proto *p, ip_addr local, struct iface *ifa)
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| {
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|   sock *sk = sk_new(p->tpool);
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|   sk->type = SK_UDP;
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|   sk->saddr = local;
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|   sk->dport = ifa ? BFD_CONTROL_PORT : BFD_MULTI_CTL_PORT;
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|   sk->iface = ifa;
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|   sk->vrf = p->p.vrf;
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|   sk->data = p;
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| 
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|   sk->tbsize = BFD_MAX_LEN;
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|   sk->err_hook = bfd_err_hook;
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| 
 | |
|   /* TODO: configurable ToS, priority and TTL security */
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|   sk->tos = IP_PREC_INTERNET_CONTROL;
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|   sk->priority = sk_priority_control;
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|   sk->ttl = ifa ? 255 : -1;
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|   sk->flags = SKF_THREAD | SKF_BIND | SKF_HIGH_PORT;
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| 
 | |
|   if (sk_open(sk) < 0)
 | |
|     goto err;
 | |
| 
 | |
|   sk_start(sk);
 | |
|   return sk;
 | |
| 
 | |
|  err:
 | |
|   sk_log_error(sk, p->p.name);
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|   rfree(sk);
 | |
|   return NULL;
 | |
| }
 |