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This PR changes the code that calculates the validity of the full validation chain to also consider the validity of the EE certificates of the publication points along the chain. It also adds a new field in the jsonext output format that provides the time when any of the publication points along the validation chain become stale.
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213 lines
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Advanced Features
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=================
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Routinator offers several advanced features to let operators gain operational
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experience with some of the ongoing work in the Internet Engineering Task
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Force to improve and augment RPKI.
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.. note::
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The Hosted RPKI systems that the RIRs offer currently only support the
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creation of ROAs. To manage ASPA, BGPsec or other RPKI objects, you can
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run Delegated RPKI with `Krill <https://krill.docs.nlnetlabs.nl/>`_.
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ASPA
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----
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Autonomous System Provider Authorisation (ASPA), currently described in two
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Internet drafts in the IETF, applies the concepts of authenticated origins we
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know from ROAs to the propagation of routes. An ASPA is a digitally signed
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object through which the holder of an Autonomous System (AS) can authorise
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one or more other ASes as its upstream providers. When validated, an ASPA's
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content can be used for detection and mitigation of route leaks.
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.. note::
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ASPA support is temporarily behind a feature flag while the draft is under
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discussion in the IETF. This way operators can gain operational experience
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without unintended side effects. See
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:ref:`building:Enabling or Disabling Features` for more information.
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You can let Routinator process ASPA objects and include them in the published
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dataset, as well as the metrics, using the :option:`--enable-aspa` option
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or by setting ``enable-aspa`` to True in the :doc:`configuration
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file<configuration>`. ASPA information will be exposed via RTR, as well as
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in the :term:`json` and :term:`jsonext` output formats, e.g.:
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.. code-block:: json
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{
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"metadata": {
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"generated": 1681829067,
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"generatedTime": "2023-04-18T14:44:27Z"
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},
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"roas": [{
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"asn": "AS196615",
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"prefix": "93.175.147.0/24",
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"maxLength": 24,
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"source": [{
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"type": "roa",
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"uri": "rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository/DEFAULT/73/fe2d72-c2dd-46c1-9429-e66369649411/1/49sMtcwyAuAW2lVDSQBGhOHd9og.roa",
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"validity": {
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"notBefore": "2023-01-01T08:44:47Z",
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"notAfter": "2024-07-01T00:00:00Z"
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},
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"chainValidity": {
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"notBefore": "2023-04-18T14:32:13Z",
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"notAfter": "2023-04-20T00:00:00Z"
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},
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"stale": "2023-04-20T00:00:00Z"
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}]
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}],
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"routerKeys": [],
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"aspas": [{
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"customer": "AS64496",
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"afi": "ipv6",
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"providers": ["AS64499", "AS64511", "AS65551"],
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"source": [{
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"type": "aspa",
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"uri": "rsync://acmecorp.example.net/0/AS64496.asa",
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"tal": "ripe",
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"validity": {
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"notBefore": "2023-04-13T07:21:24Z",
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"notAfter": "2024-04-11T07:26:24Z"
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},
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"chainValidity": {
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"notBefore": "2023-04-18T14:32:13Z",
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"notAfter": "2023-04-20T00:00:00Z"
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},
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"stale": "2023-04-20T00:00:00Z"
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}]
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}]
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}
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.. seealso::
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- `A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization
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<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile>`_
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- `BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on Autonomous System Provider
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Authorization (ASPA) Objects
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<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification>`_
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- `Manage ASPA objects with Krill
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<https://krill.docs.nlnetlabs.nl/en/stable/manage-aspas.html>`_
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.. versionadded:: 0.13.0
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BGPsec
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------
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The goal of BGPsec, as described in :RFC:`8209`, is to provide full AS path
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validation. For this operators will need to publish BGPsec router keys in the
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RPKI. As there is currently very limited deployment, validating these objects
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with Routinator is not enabled by default.
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You can let Routinator process router keys and include them in the published
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dataset, as well as the metrics, using the :option:`--enable-bgpsec` option
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or by setting ``enable-bgpsec`` to True in the :doc:`configuration
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file<configuration>`. BGPsec information will be exposed via RTR, as well as
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in the :term:`SLURM`, :term:`json` and :term:`jsonext` output formats, e.g.:
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.. code-block:: json
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{
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"metadata": {
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"generated": 1626853335,
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"generatedTime": "2021-07-21T07:42:15Z"
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},
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"roas": [{
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"asn": "AS196615",
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"prefix": "93.175.147.0/24",
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"maxLength": 24,
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"source": [{
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"type": "roa",
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"uri": "rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository/DEFAULT/73/fe2d72-c2dd-46c1-9429-e66369649411/1/49sMtcwyAuAW2lVDSQBGhOHd9og.roa",
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"validity": {
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"notBefore": "2021-01-01T04:39:56Z",
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"notAfter": "2022-07-01T00:00:00Z"
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},
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"chainValidity": {
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"notBefore": "2021-05-06T12:51:30Z",
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"notAfter": "2021-05-08T00:00:00Z"
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},
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"stale": "2021-05-08T00:00:00Z"
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}]
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}],
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"routerKeys": [{
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"asn": "AS64496",
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"SKI": "E2F075EC50E9F2EFCED81D44491D25D42A298D89",
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"routerPublicKey": "kwEwYHKoZIzj0CAtig5-QfEKpTtFgiqfiAFQg--LAQerAH2Mpp-GucoDAGBbhIqMFQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEgFcjQ_D33wNPsXxnAGb-mtZ7XQrVO9DQ6UlASh",
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"source": [{
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"type": "roa",
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"uri": "rsync://acmecorp.example.net/rpki/RIPE-NLACMECORP/R0tgdREopjYdeyeI-wXUJQ4p786.cer",
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"validity": {
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"notBefore": "2021-11-09T17:04:40Z",
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"notAfter": "2022-11-09T17:04:39Z"
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},
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"chainValidity": {
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"notBefore": "2022-01-16T14:45:51Z",
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"notAfter": "2021-01-18T00:00:00Z"
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},
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"stale": "2021-01-18T00:00:00Z"
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}]
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}],
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"aspas": []
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}
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.. seealso::
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- `BGPsec Protocol Specification
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<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8205.html>`_
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- `A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation
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Lists, and Certification Requests
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<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8209.html>`_
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- `Manage BGPSec Router Certificates with Krill
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<https://krill.docs.nlnetlabs.nl/en/stable/manage-bgpsec.html>`_
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.. versionadded:: 0.11.0
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Resource Tagged Attestations
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----------------------------
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Resource Tagged Attestations (RTAs) allow any arbitrary file to be signed
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‘with resources’ by one or more parties. The RTA object is a separate file
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that cryptographically connects the document with a set of resources. The
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receiver of the object can use Routinator to show these resources, and verify
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that it was created by their rightful holder(s).
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One practical example where RTA could be valuable is to authorise a Bring
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Your Own IP (BYOIP) process, where you bring part or all of your publicly
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routable IPv4 or IPv6 address range from your on-premises network to a cloud
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provider. The document authorising BYOIP could be signed using RTA.
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RTA objects can be generated using Krill, the RPKI Certificate Authority
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software from NLnet Labs, and you can use the MyAPNIC hosted service. The
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objects can be validated using Routinator if it is built with RTA support,
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using the :ref:`features<building:enabling or disabling features>`
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functionality provided by Cargo:
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.. code-block:: text
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cargo install --locked --features rta routinator
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You can now interactively validate an RTA signed object. If it is valid,
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Routinator will report the resources used to sign the object:
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.. code-block:: text
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routinator rta acme-corp-byoip.rta
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192.0.2.0/24
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203.0.113.0/24
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2001:db8::/48
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.. seealso::
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- `A profile for Resource Tagged Attestations (RTAs)
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<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta>`_
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- `Moving RPKI Beyond Routing Security
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<https://blog.nlnetlabs.nl/moving-rpki-beyond-routing-security/>`_
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- `A proof-of-concept for constructing and validating RTAs
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<https://github.com/APNIC-net/rpki-rta-demo>`_
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.. versionadded:: 0.8.0
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